Syria: A Roadmap for a Sustainable Political Settlement. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 52, January 2014 by Couvreur, Joris
Syria: A Roadmap for a Sustainable 
Political Settlement   
Jor i s  Couvreur 
On the eve of the Geneva II conference 
and amid continued fighting on the 
ground, this short paper seeks to draw 
up a roadmap, indicating the different 
stages and steps on the way to a  
sustainable political settlement of the 
conflict in Syria. A longer term 
perspective is put forward, adopting a 
broad-based and inclusive approach, 
focused on a Syrian-led transition 
process under international supervision  
with the assistance of key third 
countries, thus preparing  the way for a 
multi-party democratic post-Baath  
future. 
The peace conference in Geneva has been set 
for the 22 January. Both sides – the regime and 
the “Syrian National Coalition” (SNC) – have 
accepted to attend. How should one proceed 
with negotiations, what would be the main 
themes for discussion and the basic principles 
governing a new order at this conference and 
beyond?  
 
STARTING POINT  
There exists a de facto stalemate on the 
ground. Although the odds favour the regime 
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at the moment (recent territorial gains, clear 
objectives, a coherent strategy and reliable 
allies), most observers agree that the present 
situation does not allow for an all-out victory 
enabling the return to the status quo ante. 
Thus the only way forward would appear to be 
a sustained cessation of armed violence by 
means of a general ceasefire followed by 
diplomatic negotiations. 
  
However, this reality is not recognized by the 
parties on the ground, each side setting 
unacceptable conditions for the other side (e.g. 
the rebels wanting the removal of Assad and 
the regime demanding an end to all military 
and financial backing of the rebels or, in their 
terms, “terrorists”). In order to overcome this 
impasse and avert the prospect of the conflict 
dragging on for many more years, international 
pressure should be substantially stepped up 
and maintained, using all available means. 
Third states, in particular in the region, should 
be closely associated with the negotiation 
process. How to start such a process?  
 
STAGE 1: ESTABLISHING CONDITIONS 
CONDUCIVE TO THE START-UP OF 
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 
Step 1: Initiating a process of confidence-
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building measures (small incremental steps), 
aimed at setting up the necessary conditions 
for a sustained cessation of violence as well as 
disarmament, demobilization and – with 
respect to non-radicalized Syrian fighters – 
reintegration (DDR). What does this imply? 
 
A first priority is to build on the temporary 
localized ceasefires, to be put in place or 
already established for the implementation of 
the chemical weapons agreement or brought 
about in any other manner. Furthermore, 
agreement should be reached on full and 
immediate access for humanitarian 
organizations (humanitarian corridors) to all 
areas affected by the fighting as well as on an 
exchange of prisoners. The arms embargo is to 
be reinstalled and stringent measures denying 
the transfer of funds to all combatant parties 
introduced. Besides with Russia and the 
neighbouring countries (in particular Lebanon 
and Iraq), close cooperation will be needed not 
only with countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia 
and Turkey but also with the Gulf states,Qatar 
and Kuwait. They should be drawn into the 
process as “facilitator states” because of their 
influence on radical Sunni groups. 
 
Step 2: Getting the opposition on board. 
Opposition groups should be encouraged to 
increase cohesion and ensure effective 
representative interlocutors, reflecting their 
pluralistic composition as well as the views of 
Syrian society. It is important not to confine 
representation to members of the Syrian 
National Coalition, who lack legitimacy with 
the fighters, but use this Coalition as an 
umbrella for all different parties. Those with 
an impact on the situation on the ground, the 
combatants (barring extremists), should be 
involved in particular. Representatives of the 
various tribes, whatever side they belong to, 
are to be drawn into the process.  
 
Step 3: Reaching out to the regime beyond 
Assad’s followers. Regime delegation should 
be broad-based, not exclusively those close to 
Assad. Members of parties other than the 
Baath party, leading representatives of the 
military, security and police forces as well as 
the business community and civil society 
organizations should be included.  
 
STAGE 2: NEGOTIATIONS ON A 
TRANSITIONAL CHARTER  
Once conditions exist for the start-up of 
negotiations – pressure on all sides 
indispensable – a decision will have to be taken 
as to the way forward: either follow the path 
pursued with several other Arab countries 
(transitional government, elections for a 
Constitutional Assembly, followed by 
presidential and parliamentary elections) or, 
mindful of the ongoing nature of the conflict 
as well as the enormous loss of life and 
destruction in the wake of the civil war, a 
different roadmap, focused on the negotiation 
of a transitional “Charter” (in fact a 
Constitution) under international supervision 
and assisted by key third states – “facilitator 
states” – subsequently to be approved by a 
referendum. This second option seems more 
adapted to the circumstances, in particular in 
view of the still overwhelming position of the 
Baath party in the country which if not 
dismantled should be totally reformed (see 
below). The idea of a “Charter” reflects the 
need to establish a new constitutional order, 
breaking with the past. It is therefore a Syrian-
led peace process under international 
supervision, assisted by key third countries. 
 
Step 1: Putting together a transitional 
government. It would be a government or 
governing body with full executive powers by 
mutual consent (along the lines agreed at 
Geneva I), including Assad (for the time being) 
and representative groups from the opposition 
(Syrian and foreign fighters on the ground 
excluding radical elements). 
 
Step 2: Determining the general principles 
(parliamentary or presidential regime, basic 
freedoms, economic system, electoral process 
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etc.) governing a transitional Charter, thus 
preparing the way for the post-Baath era. First 
priority is to restore the country’s national 
unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity (a tall 
order given present divisions) and to maintain 
a functioning state, thus averting the risk of the 
country’s borders being redrawn (in violation 
of Sykes-Picot) and creating a vacuum which 
would be filled up by militias. Therefore, it is 
not advisable to dismantle the whole of the 
existing security apparatus (mindful of the 
Libyan and Iraqi precedents) but to maintain 
governmental institutions and public services, 
including within reasonable limits military 
forces and security services. Their performance 
would have to be in accordance with 
internationally recognized human rights and 
professional standards. However, security, 
intelligence and military forces should in the 
longer term be reorganized on a competitive 
basis with a transparent recruiting system, not 
linked to confessional or ethnic considerations 
and securing their autonomy from the party in 
power. 
 
Within the framework of a multi-party 
democracy and in an effort to set up a level 
electoral playing field the Baath party is to be 
totally reformed, its multiple ties with state 
institutions cut (the party is in fact a parallel 
state, even if several attempts at reform have 
been made) and its finances rendered 
transparent so that once the Charter has been 
approved free and fair elections can be held. 
Opposition forces, broad-based and covering a 
wide range of interests, should be encouraged 
to conclude alliances (5% threshold), thus 
facilitating the creation of a credible alternative 
to a successor Baath party.  
 
The principle of a non-confessional state (a 
non-Moslem should be able to become head of 
State), the protection of the rights of minorities 
(religious and ethnic) and of women, as well as 
equal opportunities for all should be 
guaranteed by the constitution. Discrimination 
on whatever basis should be banned. 
Conditions should be put in place to establish a 
market economy, led by the private sector, and 
opening the way for the country’s integration 
in the regional and global economy. This 
system would mark a clear break with the still 
important role of the public sector, controlled 
by the interventionist economic development 
model of the past. The new order should 
provide for a modern system in matters of civil 
law (reference to systems in other counties 
such as Turkey). 
 
When opting for a presidential or 
parliamentary system, preference should be 
given to a presidential one(difference with 
Iraq), given the country’s past instability legacy 
and recent sectarian strife. A strong 
presidential system is therefore preferable, with 
the necessary checks and balances 
independence of the judiciary, rule of law, 
compliance with internationally recognized 
standards on human rights, accountability of 
those in government and a four-year 
presidential term, once renewable, as well as 
parliamentary elections every four years). 
 
In the interest of reconciliation and justice and 
in view of the multiple atrocities committed 
during the war, a system of transitional justice 
should be put in place, holding those 
responsible accountable and including 
compensation or rehabilitation for victims of 
the conflict. A Reconciliation Commission 
should be set up, not only tasked with drawing 
up punitive measures.  
 
Step 3: An agreement on general principles. 
Basic agreement should be reached on the 
applicability of these general principles 
between both official delegations under the 
chairmanship of an international intermediary, 
assisted by key third states within a set time 
limit. 
 
Step 4: Drafting process. These guiding 
principles are to be worked out by a drafting 
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committee with representatives of both sides, 
aided by legal experts and UN officials, under 
the chairmanship of the international 
intermediary. This document should give rise to 
a fairly detailed text within a set time limit which 
would be put to both official delegations. Both 
delegations would have six months, once 
renewable, to endorse the draft peace agreement.  
 
STAGE 3: ENDORSING THE DRAFT PEACE 
AGREEMENT – THE TRANSITIONAL 
CHARTER 
This is the most decisive stage since the 
agreement has to be endorsed by the top 
political representatives from both sides. 
Therefore it would seem appropriate to use all 
necessary means, including if necessary the 
threat of force, to back up the agreement. 
Several possibilities can be envisaged: 
 
Both parties accept the agreement, to be 
enforced by an armed, fairly substantial UN-
Arab League “implementation force”, mandated 
to stabilize the situation and protect the 
population. Funds should also be provided for a 
reconstruction plan.  
 
The opposition accepts the agreement, the 
government rejects it. In this case a 
humanitarian zone should be set up, possibly in 
the south bordering Jordan, enforced by a no-fly 
zone. Serious incidents cannot be ruled out. This 
could give rise to a military intervention.  
 
Both sides reject the agreement. In this event the 
conflict continues. Arms embargo, mentioned 
under stage 1 / step 1, remains in place as well 
as measures denying financing to fighters on the 
ground.  
 
The government accepts the negotiated draft 
agreement while the opposition rejects it. This 
should give rise to added pressure on the rebels 
in the same way as happened in Rambouillet in 
February/March 1999 with respect to the 
conflict between Serbia and Kosovo.  
 
CONCLUSION  
An attempt has been made to outline a 
comprehensive strategy with a longer term 
vision, incorporating various dimensions 
(political, military, humanitarian and 
rebuilding). The adopted approach is broad-
based and inclusive, covering internal and 
external actors, reflecting the pluralistic 
composition of the opposition and with the 
direct involvement of countries supporting the 
different sides. The objective is to open up the 
country to a multi-party democratic future 
while preserving its unity and territorial 
integrity. The threat of force is used as a last 
resort in an attempt to bring the conflict to an 
end. 
 
It is unlikely that any measure of stability will 
be achieved, enabling a new order to take root, 
without an important armed UN/Arab League 
protection and stabilization force, tasked with 
ensuring compliance, ward off violations and 
expel remaining radical elements, thus reducing 
sectarian and ethnic strife. President Assad 
should be allowed to participate in this system. 
It cannot be ruled out that he will win the 
following Presidential elections and that his 
party – under whatever name – wins the most 
seats in parliamentary elections. However, 
there is a real prospect that within this new 
constitutional framework the principle of 
alternation of power will prevail in the longer 
term provided that a mechanism of 
accountability for war crimes and 
reconciliation is put in place. 
 
 
Jor is  Couvreur i s  a former Belg ian 
ambassador to Syria.  
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